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DUKE POWER: ANXIOUS IMPRIMATUR FOR
THE NUCLEAR POWER SUBSIDY
Gene R. Nichol, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
In 1954, Congress decided that the national interest re-
quired the abandonment of exclusive government ownership
of nuclear facilities and the encouragement of widespread par-
ticipation by the private sector in the production of nuclear
electric power. Since the unique nature of this form of energy
production made it impossible totally to rule out the risk of a
major nuclear accident and the massive potential liability re-
sulting from such a catastrophe, private industry was unable
or unwilling to make the substantial investments necessary to
make use of the new technology. Thus, in 1957, the Price-An-
derson Act was passed by Congress for the dual purposes of
"protecting the public ... and . . . encourag[ing] the devel-
opment of the atomic energy industry."' The Act places a ceil-
ing of $560 million on the amount recoverable for injury,
death or property damage resulting from any single nuclear
accident. In the event of such an accident, the Act contem-
plates certain contributions by the nuclear power industry
through private insurance with the remainder of the ceiling
figure to be provided by the government. The statute was ex-
tended in 1966 and again in 1975 with coverage presently in
force until 1987. Specifically, pursuant to section 2210(e) of
the Act, Congress assumes the responsibility to take "neces-
sary and appropriate" action in the event of a disaster involv-
ing damages in excess of $560 million.2 Because of the limited
liability and the potential scope of injury resulting from a nu-
clear accident, this portion of the Act has been the focal point
© 1980 by Gene R. Nichol, Jr.
* Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; B.A., 1973,
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1. 42 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1976). The Price-Anderson Act is set forth at id. §§ 2012,
2014, 2039, 2073, 2210, 2232, 2239.
2. Id. § 2210(e).
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of much controversy.
In Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group," the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act's limitation on lia-
bility. This article will examine the decision in Duke Power
not only because of its timeliness and national import, but be-
cause the treatment of the claims put forth by the Carolina
Environmental Study Group (CESG) is indicative of the posi-
tion taken by the Court with regard to other challenges made
recently to federal nuclear power policy.
4
Although faced with troublesome questions of standing
and substantive review, the Court had little difficulty overrul-
ing the trial court's determination of unconstitutionality in
sustaining the validity of the Price-Anderson Act. In the pro-
cess, the Court employed what can only be characterized as
"all deliberate speed" to uphold federal action in the field of
nuclear energy. The Duke Power decision represents the
clearest possible signal to Congress, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, and the private nuclear power industry, that the
federal judiciary will take a "hands-off" posture with regard
to any future challenges to nuclear power policy-even if such
a posture results in the sacrifice of substantial personal rights
purportedly protected by the Constitution.
The challenge to the Price-Anderson limitation in Duke
Power was brought by certain environmental groups and indi-
viduals living near two nuclear power plants being constructed
by Duke Power Company at Lake Wylie, South Carolina and
Lake Norman, North Carolina. The plaintiffs claimed direct
injury as a result of the enactment of the Price-Anderson Act
and further alleged that the Act's provisions denied their right
to due process and equal protection of the laws. Seeking only
declaratory relief, CESG named both Duke Power Company
3. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
4. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court avoided the
substantive issue of the environmental impact of the storage of radioactive wastes by
focusing on the procedural issues of the case. The Court held that courts may not
require unending procedures in excess of those guaranteed by 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976),
even where such procedures are clearly inadequate for a given situation. Id. at 548.
In the second part of the opinion, the Court ruled that administrative agencies
will not be required to consider energy alternatives proposed by outsiders in reaching
nuclear licensing decisions. Id. at 552-53. See also, Note, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 799
(1979).
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and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as defendants.5
Judge McMillan of the Western District of North Caro-
lina ruled that the controversy was justiciable, the plaintiffs
had demonstrated standing to sue, and the liability limita-
tions set forth in the Price-Anderson Act ran afoul of the fifth
amendment's due process clause and its implied equal protec-
tion requirement. The Supreme Court reversed the determi-
nation of unconstitutionality after sustaining the trial court's
standing decision. As the following discussion indicates, the
Burger Court took an uncharacteristically broad view of the
standing and justiciability issues in order to make it clear that
the Price-Anderson Act would withstand constitutional chal-
lenge. Further, the scrutiny, or more properly, the lack of
scrutiny with which the Court reviewed the provisions of the
Act demonstrates a complete refusal by the Court to seriously
consider any challenge to the federal government's role in the
nuclear power industry.
STANDING: RUSH TO JUDGMENT
The plaintiffs in Duke Power alleged two distinct catego-
ries of injuries as their sources of standing. As a result of the
very construction and operation of the nuclear plants in their
proximity, several immediate adverse effects were claimed.
Among these identified present injuries were the production
and release of low-level non-natural radiation, a sharp in-
crease in the temperature of the two lakes in question de-
stroying their use for recreational purposes, reduction in prop-
erty values of land surrounding the plants, interference with
the normal use of the waters of the neighboring Catawba
River, and "objectively reasonable" fears of a nuclear catas-
trophe.6 A second class of potential effects was also found by
the trial court including the $560 million damage limitation
which would affect plaintiffs in the event of a core melt-down
or other major incident. 7
5. Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
6. Id. at 209-10.
7. Id. at 214. 42 U.S.C. d 2014(q) (1970) defines a nuclear incident as
any occurrence ... within the United States causing, within or outside
the United States, bodily injury, disease, sickness, or death, or loss of or
damage to property, or loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting
from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of
1980.1
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The very nature of the injuries alleged and the relation-
ship of those injuries to the ultimate claim that the Price-An-
derson Act's limitation on liability was unconstitutional
presented the Court with several difficult areas of standing
analysis.
Recovery for Potential Injuries
The "potential" injuries (losses over and above the Price-
Anderson limitation in the event of a major accident) de-
scribed by the trial court in Carolina Environmental Study
Group v. United States,8 are significantly speculative. In the
event of a catastrophe the plaintiffs' common-law tort recov-
eries could not exceed the limitation. The record demon-
strated that the likelihood of an accident of such great magni-
tude, although a real possibility, was small.9 Congress'
commitment to consider compensation in excess of the statu-
tory limitation in the event of such losses also theoretically
worked to reduce the chances that the plaintiffs could ulti-
mately go uncompensated. Furthermore, there was no indica-
tion that, absent the recovery ceiling, Duke Power Company
could reasonably be expected to pay a judgment in excess of
$560 million. In light of the continued refusal to base standing
on conjectural or speculative injuries, as manifested by such
cases as Roe v. Wade,10 O'Shea v. Littleton," and Younger v.
Harris,12 the Court was reluctant to base its standing determi-
nation upon the potential effects of a major nuclear disaster.
source, special nuclear, or byproduct material ...
8. 431 F. Supp. 203, 209-10 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
9. Id. at 210-11.
10. 410 U.S. 113, 127-29 (1973). In Roe, plaintiffs Doe, a childless married
couple, attacked the Texas anti-abortion statute on the ground that it would detri-
mentally affect them should Mrs. Doe become pregnant in the future. Citing Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court found the possible future unpreparedness for
parenthood too speculative an interest to allow standing. Plaintiff Roe, who was al-
ready pregnant, was granted standing.
11. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). Respondents complained that county officials had en-
gaged in prejudicial administration of criminal justice in Alexander County, Illinois.
The Court denied standing, holding that it was only speculation whether respondents,
if arrested, would be prejudicially served by the county's criminal system.
12. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Petitioners contended that defendant Harris' conviction
under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act would inhibit their right of free
speech through fear of prosecution. Standing was denied as the parties had not been
arrested or otherwise prosecuted and, therefore, the claimed injury was merely
speculative.
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As indicated above, however, the plaintiffs proved a full
panoply of present effects from the operation of the plants in
order to meet the traditional injury-in-fact standing require-
ment. Damages from low-level radiation and other environ-
mental concerns clearly constituted injury-in-fact under cases
such as Sierra Club v. Morton,'3 and United States v.
Scrap."' But the injuries alleged by CESG resulted from the
construction and operation of the power plants themselves
without regard to any accident, much less one with damages
in excess of $560 million. The plaintiffs' claim on the merits
was that the Price-Anderson limitation is unconstitutional.
Accordingly, in order for standing to exist on the basis of the
present injuries sustained, the Court not only had to link the
allegedly unconstitutional limitation to the operation of the
plants, but also to determine the extent to which a relation-
ship is required between the harms alleged for standing pur-
poses and the illegal activity claimed.
Substantial Likelihood of Effective Judicial Relief
Well-settled standing analysis requires not only injury-in-
fact but a demonstration that the challenged action actually
caused the litigant's injury."3 Stated more specifically, the
causation requirement demands that plaintiff show "an injury
to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable deci-
sion."16 Such a demonstration of substantial likelihood of ef-
13. 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). The injury-in-fact in Sierra Club was the adverse
change to the Sequoia National Forest's aesthetics and ecology that would result from
the construction of a proposed ski area. While standing was denied to the club be-
cause it asserted no individualized harm to itself or its members, the Court intimated
that damage to an area's ecology was justiciable where individualized harm was
alleged.
14. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). Plaintiff asserted that the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission's (ICC) orders regarding railway surcharge rates would adversely affect the
environment by discouraging the transportation and use of recyclable materials. The
Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling that the ICC's decision was a major
federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. By specif-
ically alleging that the illegal action of the ICC would harm them in their use of the
natural resources of the Washington area, plaintiffs elicited a favorable holding that
standing is not confined to those who show economic harm since " 'aesthetic and en-
vironmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the
quality of life in our society.' " Id. at 686 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at
734).
15. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-21 (1978).
16. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41
(1976).
1980]
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fective judicial relief is based on the reasonable concern that,
absent such a showing, the exercise of remedial power by a
federal court would constitute a gratuitous exercise and thus
be inconsistent with article III limitations.
In Duke Power, the Court found that the plaintiffs' inju-
ries could fairly be traced to the Price-Anderson Act. The trial
court made extensive findings based on expert testimony and
the legislative history of the Act and held that a "but for"
causal relationship existed between the Price-Anderson Act
and the construction of private nuclear facilities, and also spe-
cifically indicated a substantial likelihood that the nuclear
plants could be neither completed nor operated absent the
limitation. 17 The Supreme Court concluded that the finding
was not "clearly erroneous" and therefore considered the inju-
ries claimed substantially likely to be redressed if plaintiffs
prevailed on the merits. 8
Analysis of recent cases involving this aspect of the causa-
tion requirement reveals that the Court took a decidedly more
lenient standing approach in Duke Power than it had in cer-
tain past cases in which the Justices were less anxious to
reach the merits. In Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,'9 the mother of
an illegitimate child sought to enjoin the discriminatory appli-
cation of a Texas statute making any parent who fails to sup-
port his children subject to prosecution. State judicial con-
struction had rendered the statute applicable only to married
parents. In denying plaintiff standing, the Court ruled that
the requested non-discriminatory enforcement would result in
the jailing of the child's father, but not necessarily in payment
17. Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. at 218.
There can be no question that the Act has achieved its purpose of stimulating
investment. Generation of electricity from nuclear power plants is today a multi-bil-
lion dollar industry. 121 CONG. REc. 39059, 39064 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Roncalio)
($80 billion industry). It supplies 8% of the nation's electric power and much larger
percentages of the power used in certain regions (e.g., 24% in New England). Id. at
40960 (remarks of Sen. Pastore). There are currently some 238 nuclear facilities be-
yond the planning stage, including 56 that are licensed to operate and 63 that are
under construction. Id.
The continual pressure that industry representatives have exerted upon Congress
for creation and extension of the protection offered by Section 2201(e) attests to its
importance to potential investors. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 648, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1975).
18. 438 U.S. at 74-78.
19. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
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of support .20 Rather, the end result-support pay-
ments-could at best be termed only "speculative." Ulti-
mately, the plaintiff's injury could be redressed only by the
independent acts of a third party.
In the questionable Warth v. Seldin2 1 case, the Court de-
nied standing to several parties challenging allegedly exclu-
sionary zoning ordinances enforced by the town of Penfield,
New York. The petitioners contended that their injuries
flowed from the exclusionary ordinances that rendered them
unable to secure suitable housing in Penfield. In framing the
particularized injury requirement, the Court required that pe-
titioners allege facts from which it could reasonably be in-
ferred that, absent the respondent's zoning practices, they
would have been able to obtain housing in Penfield. Standing
was denied because the realization of the plaintiffs' desire to
live in Penfield was dependent on the willingness of third par-
ties to build low cost housing. As a result, petitioners were
unable to show "that prospective relief . . . would .. .re-
move the harm."2'
In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion,2: the Court demonstrated an even stronger reluctance togrant standing when the activities of third parties would play
a part in the accomplishment of effective relief. In Simon, sev-
eral indigents sued the Secretary of the Treasury and Com-
missioner of the Internal Revenue Service asserting the ille-
gality of a revenue ruling allowing favorable tax treatment to
non-profit hospitals that offered only emergency room service
to indigents. The indigents claimed that the ruling, reversing
prior IRS decisions that had required a hospital to treat indi-
gents to the full extent of its financial capacity, resulted in thedenial of hospital access to the poor. After assuming the exis-
tence of such a denial, the Supreme Court denied standing,
20. Id. at 617-18.
21. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). The specificity required by the majority in Warth
would appear to be inconsistent with the prior line of zoning ordinance contests
where standing was granted, including: James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971);Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272U.S. 365 (1926) (plaintiff need not apply for a building permit where the ordinance inquestion destroyed the value of the land in order to gain standing). Plaintiffs in both
Hunter and James gained standing by contending the unconstitutionality of allegedly
racially based zoning ordinances.
22. 422 U.S. at 505 (emphasis added).
23. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
1980]
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finding that whether the exercise of the Court's remedial pow-
ers would result in the availability of such services was a mat-
ter of pure speculation. The opinion indicated that "it is just
as plausible that the hospitals to which respondents may ap-
ply for service would elect to forego favorable tax treatment
. . ,,2 The Court rejected as mere "conflicting evidence"
proof by the petitioners that at least some local hospitals were
sufficiently dependent on favorable tax treatment that a
changed policy towards indigents would necessarily result
from a favorable decision.2
The decisions in Linda R. S., Warth, and Simon indicate
a basic reluctance to entertain cases in which allegedly uncon-
stitutional governmental action is combined with the indepen-
dent acts of third parties to cause harm to the plaintiff. The
fact that a judicial decree in Linda R. S. requiring non-dis-
criminatory enforcement of child-support laws would only
tend to make support for the plaintiff more likely-as op-
posed to assuring it-was considered fatal. Since the plaintiffs
in Warth and Simon failed to clearly prove that they would
receive housing and hospital care respectively, even if they
won on the merits, their claims were also dismissed. A similar
situation in Duke Power, however, provided a sufficient basis
for standing.
The Duke Power plaintiffs claimed various harms from
the operation of the nuclear plants. But if the requested relief
were granted, i.e., if the Price-Apderson limitation were de-
clared unconstitutional, it is far from clear whether the nu-
clear plants would have been abandoned. The Duke plants
were well on the road to completion at the time the trial court
decision was rendered; great expense and capital investment
had already been made. No doubt, the final decision as to
whether or not to abate the activity that led to the claimed
harms rested solely within the discretion of Duke Power
Company.26
The trial court concluded that Duke Power would be un-
likely to be able to finish and operate the plants without the
limitation.27 The opinion below primarily outlined a "but for"
24. Id. at 43.
25. Id. at 43-44.
26. 438 U.S. at 77 n.22.
27. 431 F. Supp. at 203. Duke Power stated for the lower court that it would
finish construction of all plants regardless of any adverse decision concerning the
[Vol. 20
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relationship between the Price-Anderson Act and the original
determination by the private sector in general, and Duke
Power in particular, to enter the nuclear power industry. Fur-
ther, in sustaining the trial court determination, the Supreme
Court focused on the industry's general unwillingness to com-
mit itself to nuclear power absent the limitation. But the sen-
timent of Linda R. S., Warth, and Simon demands not only a
clear showing that the govermental activity helped cause theinjury but also a demonstration that if the requested relief is
forthcoming the claimed injury would be removed.
For example, the analysis in Linda R. S. did not turn on
whether the delinquent father refused to support his child be-
cause of the discriminatory enforcement of the Texas statute.
Rather, the Court demanded a showing that a judicial decree
of the unconstitutionality of discriminatory enforcement
would indeed result in payment to the plaintiff. Similarly, in
Simon, the examination was not whether the revenue ruling in
question caused the denial of hospital access to indigents, but
whether a decision striking down the ruling would result in
hospital treatment for the poor. In both instances, standing
was denied because a judicial decree on the merits could have
been rendered meaningless if contrary action by a third party
was forthcoming.
In Duke Power, the Court determined that the limitation
caused the development of the private nuclear power indus-
try. There was no significant consideration given, however, to
the more difficult question of whether, given the removal of
the Price-Anderson limitation, Duke Power Company would
make the decision to let two substantially developed nuclear
power plants sit idle. Only if such a decision were made would
plaintiffs' injuries be removed. Further, the record revealed
direct testimony by Duke Power officials that they would at-
tempt to proceed with the plants even in the absence of Price-
Anderson.8 Had the plaintiffs prevailed on the merits and
Duke Power continued with the plants, the Court's decision
would have been rendered purely gratuitous as a vehicle for
removing the injuries upon which standing was based.
Given the factual situation in Duke Power, a strong argu-
ment can be made that plaintiffs were no more certain of
Price-Anderson Act. Id. at 218.
28. 438 U.S. at 77 n.22.
1980)]
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achieving effective relief than were the petitioners in Linda R.
S., Warth, and Simon. But in those cases, the Court dealt
with challenges to governmental practices, the merits of which
it was less anxious to reach. In Duke Power, it was determined
that the "court's remedial powers would redress the claimed
injuries"29 without significant scrutiny of the real questions
involved.
It is reasonably clear that the tough application of the
causation requirement in Linda R. S., Warth, and Simon was
undesirably rigid in that it denied a forum to strong constitu-
tional claims when the litigants had aptly shown a sufficiently
concrete "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy."
' 0
The refusal to apply the requirement strictly in Duke Power
was the first signal that, in order to render a decision support-
ing the constitutionality of Congress' involvement in the nu-
clear power industry, the Burger Court was more than willing
to suspend its past standing and jurisdictional 1 guidelines.
The Nexus Requirement
Having determined the plaintiffs' injuries likely to be re-
dressed, the Court next considered the relationship, if any, re-
quired between the injuries claimed for purposes of standing
and the alleged unconstitutional activity. The plaintiffs had
alleged present injuries to health, property, and environment
from the operation of the plants, but those injuries were unre-
lated to the fifth amendment attack on the Price-Anderson
Act. Undeniably, even if the limitations were five times $560
million, the immediate adverse effects of the plants' opera-
tions would be the same. Indeed, if the limitation were irra-
tionally based, the plaintiffs could claim a due process viola-
tion only if one of the plants exploded. The alleged
irrationality of the limitation could not be seen as providing a
right to prevent injuries caused by the plants in the normal
course of operation. As a result, if a nexus were required be-
tween the injuries claimed and the rights invoked, standing
would have been denied.2
29. Id. at 74.
30. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
31. Justices Rehnquist and Stevens argued in concurring opinions that there
was jurisdiction over neither the Nuclear Regulatory Commission nor Duke Power
Company. 438 U.S. at 95 (concurring opinion).
32. The only injury possessing the required subject-matter nexus to the due
[Vol. 20
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The Court escaped such a conclusion in the instant case
by distinguishing it from its predecessors on the grounds that
the nexus requirement applies only to taxpayer suits. Of
course, Flast v. Cohen33 and its progeny required that a tax-
payer establish a nexus between that status and the "precise
nature of the constitutional infringement alleged.""4 Duke
Power, however, ruled that in suits where taxpayer status is
not the basis for standing, such requisites will be served by
the article III requirement of an injury-in-fact redressable by
the requested relief.3 5
The Court specifically denied Duke Power Company's al-
legation that the plaintiffs lacked standing, stating that
no cases have been cited outside the context of taxpayer
suits where we have demanded this type of subject matter
nexus between the right asserted and the injury alleged
and we are aware of none. 6
The foregoing pronouncement must be considered rather bold
in light of the following language from Linda R. S. v. Richard
D., where standing was not based on the party's taxpayer
status:
Appellant has failed to allege a sufficient nexus between
her injury and the government action which she attacks
to justify judicial intervention .... As this Court made
plain in Flast v. Cohen. . .a plaintiff must show a logical
nexus between the status asserted by the litigant and the
claim sought to be adjudicated .... Such inquiries into
the nexus between the status asserted by the litigant and
the claim he presents are essential to assure that he is a
proper and appropriate party to invoke federal judicial
process challenge is the speculative injury that would result from a nuclear accident
causing damages in excess of the liability limitation. If, however, the Court had been
willing to recognize injury based upon the chilling effect inherent in the possibility of
injury without adequate compensation, a present injury with the required subject-
matter nexus could have been found.
33. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that disbursements to
sectarian schools violated the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first
amendment. Granting the plaintiffs the right to maintain the action, the Court held
that in addition to the nexus requirement, the taxpayers must establish a logical link
between their status as taxpayers and the type of enactment attacked, as it would not
be sufficient to allege incidental expenditure of tax funds in order to achieve stand-
ing. Id. at 102-03.
34. Id. at 102.
35. 438 U.S. at 79.
36. Id. at 78-79.
19801
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The declarations set forth above in Linda R. S. were dis-
missed as dicta in a footnote to the Duke Power opinion.38
By choosing to see the question of the relationship be-
tween the claims asserted and the injuries alleged as merely a
decision of whether to extend the nexus requirement beyond
the taxpayer context, the Court successfully dodged the
tougher issues presented. As Mr. Justice Stewart stated in his
concurring opinion, "Surely there must be some direct rela-
tionship between the plaintiff's federal claim and the injury
relied on for standing."39 For example, assume that a compet-
ing coal-fired power station operated within a short distance
of the nuclear plant. If such a plant claimed that the Price-
Anderson Act violated its rights to due process by arbitrarily
limiting its recovery in the event of a nuclear disaster, could
standing be based on a present injury-in-fact due to lost reve-
nues as a result of the nuclear competitor?
An affirmative holding in the above example would be in-
consistent with the general standing mandate that the "con-
stitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests
properly can be understood as granting persons in the plain-
tiff's position a right to judicial relief. ' 40 Can a due process
challenge to a law limiting liability in the event of a nuclear
catastrophe be seen as granting a plaintiff the right to assert a
claim based upon a change in the water temperature of a local
lake? Certainly no definitive answer to such questions can be
drawn from the decision in Duke Power. The Court was ap-
parently so determined to find standing in order to sustain
the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act that difficult
questions regarding the "case or controversy" requirement
were treated only superficially.
Unfortunately, proponents of liberal standing guidelines
have no cause to feel heartened. On the surface, Duke Power
could be seen as a relaxation of the Court's previously rigid
applications of the causation and nexus requirements. But the
decision was careful to point out the existence of "general
37. 410 U.S. at 617-18.
38. 438 U.S. at 79 n.24.
39. Id. at 95 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result).
40. 422 U.S. at 500.
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prudential concerns""' aimed at limiting the role of courts in a
democratic society, as embodied in such cases as Warth v.
Seldin,'2 Schlesinger v. Reservists To Stop The War,"4 and
U.S. v. Richardson." The meaning of such references should
be clear: the Duke Power decision represents merely a tempo-
rary suspension of standing requisites based upon the desire
to clear up any lingering constitutional doubts with regard to
Congress' involvement in the nuclear power industry. That
suspension was based largely on the need, as expressed by
both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the private nu-
clear power industry, 5 for a Supreme Court decision delineat-
ing the constitutional validity of the Price-Anderson Act.
THE MERITS: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRICE-ANDERSON
ACT
Although the standing analysis is of interest as an indica-
tor of how anxious the Court was to decide the substantive
claims made by the plaintiffs in Duke Power, it is only a thor-
ough consideration of the decision rendered on the merits that
clearly demonstrates the full extent of the deaf ear that the
Court will apparently turn to any future challenge to federal
nuclear power policy. The district court had held the Price-
Anderson Act constitutionally infirm in two respects. First,
the Act violated the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment because it allowed "the destruction of the property or
lives of those affected by nuclear catastrophe without reasona-
ble certainty that the victims will be justly compensated."' 6
Second, it ran afoul of the equal protection requirement be-
cause it provided a benefit to the whole of society, yet it
"place[d] the cost of that benefit on an arbitrarily chosen seg-
41. 438 U.S. at 80.
42. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
43. 418 U.S. 208 (1973).
44. 418 U.S. 166 (1973). Plaintiff was denied standing in a suit to have the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Act declared unconstitutional. The Court relied on Frothing-
ham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), to support the proposition that a taxpayer may
not use the federal courts simply as a forum to air his grievances about the conduct of
the federal government.
45. See Brief of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 5-7; Brief of American
Public Power Association at 4; Brief of Atomic Industrial Forum at 35-41; Brief of
Babock & Wilcox at 10-13; Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
46. 431 F. Supp. at 222.
19801
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ment of society, those injured by nuclear catastrophe."' The
Supreme Court reversed both holdings.
The primary legal question faced on the merits, as is
often the situation in due process and equal protection analy-
sis, was the determination of the appropriate standard of re-
view. The defendants claimed that the Act represented a leg-
islative balancing of economic interests, and, as a result,
should be accorded the traditional presumption of validity.
CESG, however, argued that the rights involved were of such
importance that at least an intermediate standard of review, if
not strict scrutiny, was proper. The Court characterized the
Act as a "classic example of economic regulation.'
8 As a re-
sult, the traditional presumption of constitutionality was ap-
plied and the Court completely deferred to Congress' legisla-
tive decision. Therefore, the determination that the Price-
Anderson Act involves classic economic regulation was tanta-
mount to a holding that the Act was nonreviewable.
An Appropriate Standard of Review
Modern due process and equal protection analysis has de-
veloped on the basis of an essentially two-tiered standard of
review. Since the downfall of the exercise of formal substan-
tive due process,' 9 legislative enactments dealing with social
or economic interests have been accorded a strong presump-
tion of validity, subject to attack only if demonstrated to be
arbitrary or irrational.50 If, however, a governmental policy in-
terferes with the exercise of a "fundamental" right, the policy
is constitutionally defective unless it can be shown to be nec-
essary to carry out a compelling or overriding governmental
interest.6 1 Similarly, if a law burdens a class of persons deter-
mined to be constitutionally "suspect," the Court will subject
the law to "strict scrutiny" to see if it promotes a compelling
47. Id. at 225.
48. 438 U.S. at 83.
49. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
50. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Reviewing a proceeding
under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act to challenge the constitutionality of an
Oklahoma statute dealing with visual care, the Court held that a law need not be
logically consistent with its aims in order to be adjudged constitutional, and where
there is an evil at hand, rational measures to correct it will be upheld. See also City
of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
51. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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state interest.52 An intermediate standard has been used in
certain sex-based discrimination cases requiring that the legis-
lative enactment "serve important governmental objectives
and . . . be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives. ' '5 The Price-Anderson Act obviously involved no
suspect classification or discrimination based on sex. In refus-
ing to consider Price-Anderson's provisions under an elevated
standard of review, however, the Court turned its back on in-
terests of the plaintiffs crucial to their very existence and, in-
deed, as explicitly protected by the fifth amendment as many
rights characterized as "fundamental" in previous decisions.
The interests asserted. The determination of the proper
standard of review necessitates an analysis of the rights and
interests of the plaintiffs that are affected by the contested
statute. The Price-Anderson Act was attacked as an unreason-
able limitation of liability; i.e., the plaintiffs might be forced
to settle for inadequate compensation in the event of a nu-
clear catastrophe. Furthermore, to distinguish these plaintiffs
from victims of other potential disasters, by way of the limita-
tion, allegedly constituted a violation of their right to equal
protection of the laws. Seen merely in this light, a rational
argument can be made that the plaintiffs were making a claim
based solely on dollars and cents, thereby contesting the
amount of compensation they should receive in the event of
the disaster. Under such a rationale, the Court concluded the
Price-Anderson Act was "a legislative effort to structure and
accomodate the burdens and benefits of economic life."'" Def-
erence to Congress' determination was thus applied.
But were the plaintiffs asserting mere economic rights?
Such a determination was certainly convenient for the Court.
While, for purposes of standing, the Court felt free to consider
the entire panoply of injuries sustained by the surrounding re-
sidents, when it came down to a determination of the merits,
the action was narrowly viewed as an example of "classic
economics".
The trial court made, inter alia, the following explicit
52. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964).
53. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71(1971). See also Gunther, Foreword: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Pro-
cess of Life and Laws, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973).
54. 438 U.S. at 83.
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findings of fact:
The Court finds as a fact that the probability of a
major nuclear accident producing damages exceeding the
$560,000,000 limit of the Price-Anderson Act is not fanci-
ful but real ....
It is not the kind of risk which responsible govern-
ment or business places upon bystanders.
The Court finds. . that a core melt at McGuire or
Catawba can reasonably be expected to produce hundreds
or thousands of fatalities, numerous illnesses, genetic ef-
fects of unpredictable degree and nature for succeeding
generations, thyroid ailments and cancers in numerous
people, damage to other life and widespread damage to
property. Areas as large as several thousand square miles
might be contaminated and require evacuation. 5
The lawsuit was cast in terms of the rationality of the
limitation, and to that end, economic analysis was involved.
Characterization of the plaintiffs' interests in such a fashion,
however, is painful. Certainly the interests sought to be pro-
moted by the local residents were of a more important charac-
ter than the business interests asserted in most instances of
economic regulation. 6 Further, as discussed below, the inter-
ests asserted were more closely tied to explicit constitutional
guarantees than certain areas of "social" regulation to which
the Court has also accorded a strong presumption of
constitutionality. 5 7
The trial court decided not only that the limitation was
irrational and thus a violation of due process, but it also vio-
lated equal protection principles by providing a benefit to the
whole of society by placing "the cost of that benefit on an ar-
bitrarily chosen segment of society. . ... "8 Thus, the Act cre-
ated a de facto classification distinguishing between society at
large and those persons dangerously close to nuclear power
plants. But what is the "burden" placed on such local re-
sidents as a result of the Price-Anderson Act?
55. 431 F. Supp. at 214.
56. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S.
106 (1949).
57. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
58. 431 F. Supp. at 225.
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Certainly the possibility of mass destruction without a
guarantee of adequate compensation is part of the burden; the
adequacy of compensation was, in fact, the only interest con-
sidered by the Court in Duke Power. Early in the opinion,
however, the Court specifically accepted the trial judge's find-
ing that but for the Price-Anderson limitation there would be
no nuclear plant.59 As a result of the limitation, then, the peti-
tioners suffered a myriad of adverse effects from the operation
of the plants. These injuries, which the Court was so willing to
consider for purposes of standing, included harm from the
emission of low-level radiation with commensurate latent in-
juries, birth defects and cancer, and the present objective fear
of a holocaust destroying life and property. The "burden" on
local residents also includes the possibility of severe injury or
death as the result of a core melt or other major accident. The
trial court explicitly found that these injuries existed and
were directly caused by the Price-Anderson Act; the Supreme
Court expressly affirmed those findings." Examining the in-
terests asserted by the plaintiffs, the Court erroneously disre-
garded such direct effects of the Act's limitation.
Equal protection analysis demands careful consideration
of the rights and interests affected by the challenged govern-
mental action. Clearly, the victims of the de facto classifica-
tion resulting from the Price-Anderson Act are subjected not
only to the possibility of injury without adequate compensa-
tion, but also to both the immediate and potential effects of
the operation of nearby nuclear power plants.
As noted above, plaintiffs in Duke Power, unlike the pop-
ulation at large, are exposed to low-level radiation and a rea-
sonably objective constant fear of serious injury or death as
the result of a core melt. Furthermore, the trial court held
that the risk that many of the plaintiffs would actually die as
a result of the plant's operations was "real," not fanciful."'
Yet, the Supreme Court in Duke Power took a trial court de-
termination outlining the serious nature of such injuries, ac-
cepted those findings, and still refused to exercise any sub-
stantive review of the congressional nuclear power subsidy
because it found the Price-Anderson Act constituted mere ec-
59. 438 U.S. at 77.
60. Id. at 74 n.19.
61. 431 F. Supp. at 214.
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onomic regulation. That anlysis is inconsistent with the sub-
stantive equal protection review based on the infringement of
"fundamental" rights which the Supreme Court has exercised
over the past forty years.
The nature of fundamental rights. New equal protection
analysis, requiring compelling justification for classifications
that burden specially protected interests, originated in Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma.2 In that case, the Court struck down a stat-
ute that subjected persons convicted three times of any felony
involving moral turpitude to sterilization, yet exempted those
similarly convicted of embezzlement. Because the statute
dealt with procreation, "one of the basic civil rights of man,"
the Court held that "strict scrutiny of the classification . . . is
essential."" Under such scrutiny, the Court willingly looked
beyond any presumption of constitutionality in order to deter-
mine whether the enactment was narrowly drawn in order to
effectuate a compelling interest of the state. Close scrutiny
was justified not by the nature of the classification, but by the
nature of the interest it regulated.
The doctrine of "fundamental rights" gradually evolved
to include the right to vote, 4 the right to travel between
states,65 freedom of association," the right to counsel for post-
conviction appeals,67 and a general right to privacy. s In sub-
sequent years, however, it became clear that the characteriza-
tion of rights as fundamental was not to become the func-
tional equivalent of the old substantive due process. Despite
the relative social importance of such interests as subsistence
welfare payments, 69 adequate housing,70 government employ-
ment," and education1 2 the Court has thus far refused to de-
clare them fundamental.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
62. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
63. Id. at 541.
64. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
65. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Quest, 383
U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
66. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
67. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
68. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
69. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
70. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
71. See McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976).
72. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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quez,7" while making the determination that the right to edu-
cation was not fundamental and did not merit strict scrutiny,
the Court rendered its most definitive ruling on the scope of
the fundamental rights doctrine:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. Thus the key to discovering
whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in
comparisons of the relative societal significance of educa-
tion as opposed to subsistence or housing . . . . Rather,
the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to
education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution."'
Rodriquez was not, however, a portent of the demise of
the fundamental rights doctrine. The abortion cases,7 5 for ex-
ample, emphasized that there remain concepts of fundamental
rights, including the right to privacy, either explicit or implicit
in the Constitution. Recently, in Zablocki v. Redhail,76 the
Court struck down a Wisconsin statute that required a resi-
dent, having minor dependent children not in his custody, to
obtain a court's permission before remarrying. In reaching its
decision, the Court again characterized the right to marry as
fundamental thus requiring an elevated standard of review.
Whatever the present status of the new equal protection
doctrine in general, or the fundamental rights concept in par-
ticular, the interests of American citizens in protecting them-
selves from substantial governmental abridgement of their
rights to life, to health, and to the maintenance of a certain
zone of privacy are sufficiently "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty"7 that the Court has, in the past, substantively
reviewed the acts of other branches of government when such
rights were put in jeopardy. The basis of the claim to such
rights was aptly described by the late Justice Douglas:
The Ninth Amendment obviously does not create feder-
ally enforceable rights. It merely says, "The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
73. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
74. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
75. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
77. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
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ple." But a catalogue of these rights includes customary,
traditional, and time honored rights, amenities, privileges,
and immunities that come within the sweep of "the Bless-
ings of Liberty" mentioned in the preamble to the Consti-
tution. Many of them ...come within the meaning of
the term "liberty" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment.
These rights, unlike those protected by the First
Amendment, are subject to some control by the police
power. . . .These rights are "fundamental," and we have
held that in order to support legislative action the statute
must be narrowly and precisely drawn and that a "com-
pelling state interest" must be shown in support of the
limitation.7 8
The plaintiffs in Duke Power demonstrated that the
Price-Anderson Act endangered their health on an immediate
basis and constituted a "real" threat to their very lives. That
threat must be considered a significant intrusion into rights
guaranteed in the Constitution. The fourteenth amendment
provides that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." Accordingly, a funda-
mental right to life and liberty encompassing the right to be
free from the threat of personal destruction through nuclear
accident is consistent with the requirement that an elevated
standard of review be employed for the protection of rights
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
Moreover, it is clear that other rights previously charac-
terized as fundamental, e.g., the right to procreate,7 9 to
marry,80 to use contraceptives," to direct the education of
one's children,82 and to be free from unreasonable police stops
and other intrusions8" would all be rendered meaningless if
not coupled with a strong guarantee against unreasonable
threats to life and health by either the state or federal govern-
ment. One can take little solace in the knowledge that his
freedom to use contraceptives or to travel to a neighboring
state is constitutionally protected, if a similar guarantee of
78. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210-11 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
79. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
80. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
81. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
82. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924).
83. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
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freedom from intentional governmental action which puts his
life in peril is not maintained.
Understandably, the characterization of any right as ei-
ther fundamental or non-fundamental leaves much to be de-
sired. The two-tiered approach to substantive review is obvi-
ously conclusory in nature and application. Thus, the creation
or recognition of further rights, and the bestowing of the title
"fundamental" on those rights is open to a certain degree of
criticism. In the debate over such nomenclature, however, we
would do well to recognize the reason for the development of
such a doctrine in the first place.
It cannot be denied that a general presumption of consti-
tutionality has merit in order to ensure that federal courts do
not become the true and final repositories of legislative power.
But when governmental actions significantly infringe upon
rights either expressly or implicitly guaranteed by the Consti-
tution, meaningful judicial review must be made available in
order 'to prevent the Constitution from becoming an empty,
toothless document. Whether that review is characterized as
strict scrutiny resulting from the fundamental nature of the
right is of little importance. What is absolutely essential, how-
ever, is that the federal courts engage in substantive review of
the legislative enactment to ensure that those rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution are not being sacrificed.
The failure of the Supreme Court adequately to review
Price-Anderson's threat is the ultimate mistake made by the
Court in Duke Power. Review under the traditional rational
basis test is, of course, no review at all. Accordingly, the deci-
sion in Duke Power can only be seen as a true abdication of
judicial power and responsibility.
The interests advocated by the petitioners in Duke Power
should not be equated with any claimed constitutional right
to clean air and water, although it is certainly true that air
pollution can prove harmful to life on a long-term basis. The
Constitution, however, is an inappropriate tool to ensure that
modern life, and the role of federal and state governments in
that life, is totally free from risks and impediments to good
health. Such protections are more properly fashioned by legis-
lative bodies. But federal involvement in an activity that, ac-
cording to the findings of the trial court, poses a real possibil-
ity of "hundreds or thousands of fatalities . ..illnesses .. .
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[and adverse] genetic effects," ' raises a quite different con-
cern. Government activity that directly and substantially in-
terferes with a citizen's right to be let alone in the enjoyment
of his health and security at least merits some degree of scru-
tiny by the judicial system. Nor can the side effects of nuclear
power be dismissed out-of-hand by the Aourt as the necessary
result of progress. Rather, the objectively reasonable risk of
widespread injury and death which the Court indirectly dealt
with in Duke Power concerns rights expressly guaranteed by
the Constitution. By according the Price-Anderson Act a
strong presumption of constitutional validity and thus review-
ing its provisions under a rational basis test, the Court refused
to carry out its responsibilities as protector of life and liberty
of American citizens.
The necessity of an elevated standard of review. There is
no doubt that a decision striking down the Price-Anderson
Act would be a difficult one. The competing state aims in-
volved-promotion of the private nuclear power industry and
compensation for potential nuclear accident victims-may
both constitute compelling state interests. The Court would
necessarily be taking action in a field in which the legislative
branch possesses greater expertise, as well as dealing indi-
rectly with energy policy issues more appropriately handled
by Congress. Due process and equal protection analyses, as
those bodies of law have developed over the past thirty years,
have required that the federal judiciary closely scrutinize leg-
islative enactments that infringe upon certain constitutionally
protected rights. Such scrutiny is necessary because govern-
mental abridgement of essential liberties is at odds with the
concept of freedom upon which our society is based.
As the discussion above indicates, the rights asserted by
the plaintiffs in Duke Power are not only expressly protected
in the Constitution but are crucial to the rational develop-
ment of any free society. Because of the nature of the rights
asserted, it was entirely inappropriate for the Court to review
the Price-Anderson Act under the rational basis test. Unless
the past thirty years of substantive review based upon funda-
mental rights is to be rewritten by the present Court, there
can be no valid basis for a decision that the interests asserted
in Duke Power constitute mere economic concerns and there-
84. 431 F. Supp. at 214.
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fore enjoy a presumption of constitutionality.
An elevated standard of review would require the Court
to look closely at the compelling governmental interests em-
bodied in the Price-Anderson Act and the methods used to
accomplish such goals. Certainly the energy needs of this
country are crucial. But under strict scrutiny analysis, alter-
natives that may potentially be less burdensome to the rights
of local residents would be examined.8 5 The trial court sug-
gested other rational courses, such as making nuclear acci-
dents a national loss with compensation for the injured com-
ing from the federal treasury, or creating a liability pool with
all nuclear power plants contributing-thus placing the cost
of nuclear accidents more squarely on the customers and com-
pany stockholders rather than on the victims. 6
CONCLUSION
Duke Power is a decision in which the Supreme Court
temporarily took an expansive view of traditional standing re-
quirements in order to determine the constitutionality of the
Price-Anderson limitation. On the merits, however, a strong
presumption of validity was accorded the statute and it was,
therefore, upheld without significant judicial scrutiny. In light
of the interests at stake, an elevated standard of review was
more appropriate, and the failure of the Court to so exercise
its constitutional duty was unfortunate.
It is important to note that the issues examined in Duke
Power were not characterized as political questions and, as a
result, inappropriate for judicial review. Rather, the Court un-
dertook to rule on the merits of the Price-Anderson Act, but
did so under an unduly deferential substantive standard. Of
course, a final determination of Price-Anderson's substantive
validity was essential for the peace of mind of the nuclear in-
dustry-the investing private sector. In the end, that need
was the ultimate reason for both the standing decision and
the ruling on the merits.
Ultimately, it makes little difference whether past deci-
sions mandated that the Court apply strict scrutiny in review-
ing the Price-Anderson Act or accord it a strong presumption
of constitutionality. At trial, the plaintiffs proved that, as the
85. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blunstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
86. 431 F. Supp. at 214.
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result of a federal statute, they were placed in reasonable ap-
prehension of a core melt or other accident potentially threat-
ening their lives. Regardless of whether such a threat abridges
a fundamental right, if the Supreme Court is to function as a
viable institution regarded as our ultimate guarantor of civil
liberties, interests as crucial to human freedom as those advo-
cated by the plaintiffs in Duke Power must provide the basis
for substantive judicial review.
The decision in Duke Power recognizes that the plaintiffs'
lives are endangered; the trial court's findings were unequivo-
cal in that regard. The recent accident at Three Mile Island
should impress all with the reality of the dangers associated
with nuclear power. Yet the Court merely questions whether
Congress' decision to abridge the plaintiffs' rights to life and
health was reasonably motivated. No consideration of the seri-
ous constitutional deprivation was made, nor did the Court
ensure that the means employed in the Act were narrowly
drawn to serve its aims. In short, the Court refused to con-
sider the propriety of less burdensome alternatives. Rather,
the decision effectively states: "Complain to Congress." Yet if
Congress is the source of the constitutional deprivation, reli-
ance on the political process may be meaningless. Moreover,
an individual's right to be secure in his physical well-being
should not turn on his ability to convince the majority of his
fellow citizens not to harm him.
An ultimate determination of the constitutionality of the
federal decision to subsidize nuclear power presents monu-
mental questions and problems of conflicting interest that are
not easily reconciled. The answer, however, does not lie in a
Court which closes its eyes, turns its back, and says, "there
are no major dangers . ..like Pollyanna . . . 'everything will
turn out all right.' ,,87 If that is indicative of the stance of the
federal judiciary, then the Court's role in our society will nec-
essarily be an unimportant one. If the Supreme Court is to
have any credibility, it must be capable of handling such
questions of ultimate import. If the Court chooses not to ac-
cept this responsibility, however, those persons actively seek-
ing the assurances of liberty may be forced to disregard the
legal system and seek other means of protection.
87. Id. at 225.
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